STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

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On March 29, 1969 the Government of the USSR proposed to the Government of the CPR that practical steps should be taken without delay to normalise the situation on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. In its Statement it called upon the Government of the CPR to refrain from action on the frontier which might cause complications such as have taken place in the region of Damansky Island, and to settle differences, if they should arise, in a calm atmosphere through negotiation.

The Soviet Government suggested renewing consultations with the purpose of specifying the demarcation of the frontier in individual sectors which were begun in 1964 in Peking and cut short by the Chinese side. As the possible date for the first meeting of representatives of the USSR and the CPR, the Soviet side named April 15 or "any other immediate date convenient for the Chinese side".

The Government of the Chinese People's Republic replied on May 24, 1969. In that reply the Government of the CPR accepted the proposals to hold talks, stated that it was prepared to agree on the time and place through diplomatic channels, and declared it was against the use of armed force.

It thus seemed that the road towards the negotiating table was opening.

The present aggravation between the Soviet Union and the CPR has been called forth solely by the actions of the Chinese side. If the Chinese Government likewise based

itself on the need for maintaining normal relations between the USSR and the CPR, on recognition of the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and on respect for territorial integrity and inviolability, the situation on the frontier would again return to normal. Such a turn would meet with the vital interests of the Soviet people and, we are sure, the interests of the Chinese people as well.

I.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government the fact that in the Statement of the Government of the CPR a series of claims and demands are made on the Soviet Union for which not the least grounds exist and which can have only one purport, that of adding new complications to the ones already created by the Chinese side, does not tend to create a favourable atmosphere for negotiations.

The Chinese side has evidently decided to make an assessment of some facts from the history of the relations between Russia and China in the hope that exaggeration and distortion would create a totally wrong picture, but one desired by the Chinese side, of how the frontier between our two countries took shape.

Once more the question of so-called "unequal treaties", as the Government of the CPR calls the treaties establishing the present frontier between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, is moved to the foreground. On the far-fetched pretext of removing the "injustices" committed in past centuries, the Chinese Government tries to substantiate its claim to a million and a half square kilometres of inalienable Soviet territory.

The Chinese Government would like to make the object of discussion between the USSR and the CPR not a specification of the frontier line, which was discussed at the 1964 consultations, but the question of a new Chinese-Soviet frontier from the angle of how the Chinese

side now interprets history and treaties.

The fact cannot be ignored that territorial claims on other countries occupy a very large place in China's present foreign policy and propaganda. Today the Chinese leaders claim lands which, in the past, Chinese conquerors invaded or intended to invade.

Propaganda of this kind was not started today or yesterday. It was launched gradually with the glorification of the predatory policy of the feudal lords of the past, with the publication, after 1949, of textbooks and maps showing territories of other countries as belonging to China. Then, formal territorial claims began to be made.

Since the 1960s the expansionist aspirations were openly spearheaded against the Soviet Union as well. Through arbitrary manipulation of historical facts or through the absence of such facts the Chinese side seeks to create at all costs a so-called territorial problem between the USSR and the CPR, and question the frontier existing between them. This circumstance induces us to state the factual aspect of the question.

As the Soviet Government pointed out in its Statement of March 29, the Soviet-Chinese frontier is the result of long historical development. When relations between the Russian state and China were only just beginning to be established, vast sparsely inhabited or practically uninhabited semi-desert and taiga expanses lay between them. At the time China's northern frontier, for example, was marked by the almost 4,000 kilometre long Great Wall, which stands more than 1,000 kilometres southwest of the Amur and Ussuri rivers.

At the time the Amur region was settled by Russians in the first half of the 17th century, the state of Manchuria was independent of China and inhabited by a people ethnically different from the Chinese (Hans). Moreover, in that period China herself lost her independence, becoming part of the Manchu state after the Manchus captured Peking (1644) and forced the Ching dynasty on the

Chinese people. Up to the close of the 19th century Manchuria in effect remained a separate entity, an imperial possession where Chinese were not allowed to settle or engage in economic activity.

At the end of the 17th century the Manchu emperor Kanshi organised a series of military campaigns against the Russian settlements of the Albazin voyevodship on the Amur. In a report of the Manchu generals to their emperor it was noted in this connection: "...The lands lying to the northeast for a distance of several thousand li and which have never belonged to China are now incorporated in your possessions". For some time these Russian lands were ruled by Manchu invaders.

At the close of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century the Manchu rulers conquered Mongolia, destroyed the Jungar Khanate of the Oirats, killing more than a million people—most of its population—and subjugated the Uigur state in East Turkestan (Kashgaria). In this manner the rule of the Ching emperors spread to vast regions known to this day as Singkiang, which means "new frontier". These regions are populated by Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Tungans and other nationalities. At the same time, Manchu-Chinese expansion developed southwestward and southward.

That is how reality looks if real facts are abided by and not used arbitrarily. Ching-ruled China was by no means only the objective of some foreign aggression. The Manchu-Chinese emperors, sitting on the neck of the Chinese people, pursued a colonialist policy of pillage, annexing the territories of other countries and peoples piece by piece. The formation of Chinese territory within its present boundaries was accompanied by the forced assimilation or physical annihilation of oppressed peoples. But the present historiographers of China seek in the acts of the emperors and mandarins only "arguments" to justify expansionist designs.

The frontier between the Soviet Union and China,

shaped many generations ago, mirrored and continues to mirror the actual settlement of lands by the peoples of these two states along natural mountain and river boundaries. Throughout its length this frontier is juridically recorded definitely and clearly in treaties, protocols and maps.

The Aigun Treaty, which demarcated the frontier along the Amur, was signed on May 16, 1858 in the town of Aigun by Governor-General N. Muravyov, authorised representative of the Russian state, and the Heilungchiang commander-in-chief Yi Shan, authorised representative of the Tai Ching ("Great Ching") state. This treaty, as stated in its preamble, was signed "by common consent for the sake of greater, eternal, mutual friendship of the two states, for the benefit of their subjects". The treaty was endorsed by an imperial prescript of June 2, 1858 and ratified by Russia on July 8, 1858.

The Tientsin Treaty was signed on June 1, 1858 in the town of Tientsin by the Imperial Commissioner of Russia in China Putyatin and the mandarin Hua Shan, a high-ranking official vested with the necessary authority. This treaty provided that the undetermined sections of the frontier between Russia and China should be studied on the spot without delay by persons authorised by both governments, "who would reach agreement on the frontier line". "Upon the demarcation of the frontiers", the Tientsin Treaty further stated, "a description and maps of the adjacent expanses shall be made and these shall serve the Governments for the future as indisputable documents demarcating the frontiers".

On November 2, 1860, pursuant to this agreement, a treaty was signed in Peking confirming the earlier agreements reached at Aigun and Tientsin and also determining the frontier along the Ussuri River. The Peking Treaty was signed by N. Ignatyev, representing the Russian state, and by "Prince Hung by name Yi Hsing", representing the Tai Ching state. In the Peking Treaty both sides

reiterated that it was signed "...to consolidate the friendship between the two empires still further, to develop trade relations and prevent misunderstanding..." A protocol on an exchange of maps and descriptions of the demarcation in Ussuri territory was appended to this treaty in 1861 as its component.

All the above-mentioned treaties as well as other documents defining the frontier between the Soviet Union and China retain to this day the force of inter-state documents between the two countries. Inasmuch as this cannot be denied, the Chinese side tries to sow doubt about the legality of the above-mentioned juridical acts, to this end taking recourse to direct falsification.

In the Statement of the CPR Government it is maintained that the map appended to the 1860 Peking Treaty and showing the frontier line was "unilaterally compiled by tsarist Russia". This is a deliberate untruth. Actually, the protocol on an exchange of maps was signed on June 16, 1861 by authorised commissioners of the Russian state P. Kozakevich and K. Budogossky, on the one hand, and authorised commissioners of the Tai Ching state Cheng Chi and Ching Chun, on the other. It was stamped with official seals on behalf of Russia and China.

The Protocol says that "after the final verfication of all the copies of the maps and descriptions", namely, "two maps of the demarcation line in the Russian and the Manchu languages, constituting the annex to the Treaty of Peking" and "similarly four maps and descriptions of the boundaryline from the Ussuri to the sea", "they were found to be absolutely in accord with each other". Further, the Protocol notes that "The First Commissioner of the Russian State handed to the First Commissioner of the Tai Ching State a detailed map of the border, one copy in the Russian and the Manchu languages, and the First Commissioner of the Tai Ching State, having accepted the map, in his turn, handed the Russian Commissioner the same map in the same languages. The other four maps with

descriptions of the borders from the Ussuri to the sea were similarly exchanged". All these maps bore the seals and signatures of the Russian and Chinese representatives. However, contrary to the facts fixed in the documents, the Government of the CPR, has been speaking about some kind of "unilateral" compilation of the map.

The Chinese Government's statement alleges that Damansky Island "has been Chinese territory since time immemorial", and that up to 1860 the Ussuri River had been "China's internal river". However, the historial facts once again give evidence to the contrary. As has been noted above, the northern boundaries of the Chinese state proper, until the Manchurian conquest of China, had run along the Great Wall, and had no relation at all to the Ussuri River. At the time, the Manchus themselves inhabited the area of the Liaotung Peninsula and the Liaoho River, i. e., a distance of 800 and more kilometres to the south and southwest of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. At the end of the 1670s and beginning of the 1680s, the Manchus marked off the northern limits of their empire with a "willow pale",—a line of fortifications and outposts running near Mukden. This line was manned by government border guards, and travel by Manchu subjects beyond the pale was regarded as travel abroad, testimony to which fact comes, in particular, from Pachi Tungchih Chuchi, a well-known Chinese historical description of the armed forces of the Manchurian Empire. Remains of the "willow pale" are still to be seen today. Consequently, the Ussuri could not have been an "internal river" of the Manchus either.

State demarcation in the Maritime Territory was also carried out between tsarist Russia and the Manchu-Chinese Ching Empire in the second half of the 19th century. The 1860 Treaty of Peking designated the Ussuri River as the boundaryline between Russia and China and, according to the 1861 Protocols annexed to it, "the boundary" along the river sectors was marked on the map as a red line. In the

Damansky Island area, it runs right along the Chinese bank of the river and, consequently, this island, lying on the Soviet side of the "demarcation line", belongs to the Soviet Union and not to China.

It is generally known that there are no rules in international law which automatically establish the boundary-line as running down the middle of the main fairway of border rivers. When concluding corresponding treaties, states mark the boundaryline as they see fit, according to the circumstances. There are examples in inter-state relations of the boundaryline being established along the river bank and not the fairway. The 1858 Treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua establishes that the boundary-line runs along the right bank of the San Juan River and that "The Republic of Nicaragua enjoys exclusive right of possession and sovereign jurisdiction over the waters of this river". There is a similar definition of river boundary-lines in agreements between other countries.

The Russo-Chinese 1860 Treaty of Peking is yet another example. Recognition of the fact that the borderline does not necessarily coincide with the fairway is also reflected in the Soviet-Chinese agreement governing navigation along border rivers concluded in 1951. Article One of the agreement says that navigation of border rivers by vessels of both sides shall be carried out along the main fairway, "irrespective of where the state borderline runs".

During the consultations in Peking in 1964, the Soviet side expressed readiness to meet the wishes of the Chinese side, which referred to the interests of the riparian Chinese population, and to reach agreement on laying down the borderline between the USSR and the CPR along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers on the basis of reciprocal concessions, with the proviso that the Chinese side would, for its part, show readiness to give corresponding recognition to the interests of the Soviet population on some sectors of the border. That would have been a reasonable arrangement, based on a desire of both parties to eliminate tension and

maintain tranquility on the border.

At the time, no agreement was reached because the Chinese representatives complicated the consultations by putting forward unjustified territorial and other demands which cast doubt both on the delineation of the existing border and on all the treaties defining the Soviet-Chinese boundaryline.

The CPR Government's statement of May 24 of this year asserts that in circumvention of the 1884 "Description of the State Borderline between China and Russia in the Kashgar Region", the latter had allegedly occupied over 20,000 sq. km. of Chinese territory. The fact is, however, that the Protocol of May 22, 1884, has nothing at all to do with the Pamir Region, of which the Chinese side speaks, as anyone can see for himself if he takes the trouble to read the said Protocol. The Russian and the Chinese Commissioners were engaged in drawing the borderline in the Tienshan Mountain Region between the former Fergana Region of Russia and the Chinese Kashgar Region on the sector between the Bedel mountain pass and the Uz Bel mountain pass, and upon completing their work signed the above-mentioned Protocol of May 22, 1884. The demarcation in the Pamir was effected through an exchange of Notes in 1894, when the parties agreed "not to go beyond the limits of the positions they occupy" along the Sarykol Range in the Pamir. This line exists to this day, and there is no other.

In the light of the well known facts it is, to say the least, absurd to argue that on the western sector China's borderline "runs along Lake Balkhash". Russian fortifications and populated localities were established in the upper reaches of the Irtysh very early in the 18th century. The Kazakh zhuzy (tribes) in Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan were naturalised as Russian subjects as far back as 1731 and 1740.

At the time, the Manchu Ching Empire was engaged in conquests in Central Asia and in the region of present-day

Sinkiang, and in putting down the resistance of the Oirats, Uigurs, Kazakhs and other nationalities inhabiting the territory of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan. Several hundred kilometres lay between the western limits of Ching occupations and Lake Balkhash.

After the seizure of Jungaria in 1758, the Manchus mounted sporadic raids to plunder the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomad camps. There have never been any military or civilian authorities of the Ching Empire either in Kazakhstan or anywhere else on the territory of the present-day Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia, to say nothing of the fact that there has never been any civilian Manchurian or Chinese population in these parts.

Thus, the historical facts testify that in the west the Chinese border had not extended beyond Kansu and Szechwan provinces, nor had it ever reached Lake Balkhash.

II.

In its Statement of March 29 of this year, the Soviet Government already dealt with the question of the Soviet Union's attitude to unequal treaties and to the attempts of the Chinese side to mislead public opinion on this crystal clear matter.

All unequal and secret treaties which tsarist Russia had concluded with foreign states, including China, were annulled by Lenin's decrees immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution. This step by the Soviet State expressed its determination to develop relations of friendship, equality and mutual respect with all countries, including China.

The RSFSR's July 25, 1919 Message to the Chinese people and the Government of Southern and Northern China indicated which treaties between Russia and China were specifically regarded by the Soviet Government as unequal.

The treaties declared to be annulled dealt with spheres of influence in China, extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction, concessions on Chinese territory, and the Russian share of the indemnity imposed on China by the imperialist countries after the suppression of the "Boxer Rebellion". Soviet Russia repudiated all treaties of that sort, regardless of whether they had been concluded with China or with any third countries over China.

These proposals were confirmed in the Note of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of September 27, 1920, which emphasised that the Soviet Government would undeviatingly abide by the principles set forth in the July 25, 1919, Message, and that it would make them the basis of an agreement of friendship between China and Russia.

The abolition of the unequal treaties was given legal form in the May 31, 1924 Agreement on the General Principles for Settling Questions between the USSR and the Chinese Republic.

Neither the 1919 Message, nor the 1924 Agreement between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic contain—or in fact could contain—any indications that the treaties which determine the running of the present Soviet-Chinese borderline were classified as either unequal or secret. There was naturally no question of their annulment or revision.

Until recently, the CPR leaders themselves used to stress that the Soviet State had abolished the unequal treaties with China. At the Seventh Congress of the CPC in 1945, Mao Tse-tung declared, and repeated on December 16, 1949, that "The Soviet Union was the first to repudiate the unequal treaties and has concluded with China new equal treaties". Today, judging by the Chinese statement, those who formulate China's policy give priority not to Lenin's decrees, which put an end to unequal treaties, but to the campaigns of Genghiz Khan,

Kanshi and other feudal lords, who are being extolled as "great Chinese statesmen and military leaders".

To give the appearance of validity to their claims about the "unequalness" of treaties, concerning the border between China and Russia, the Chinese government goes to the length of juggling quotations from the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. It operates liberally with statements against the policy of tsarist Russia taken out of historical context. For example, a passage from V. I. Lenin's article, "The War in China", denouncing the participation of tsarist Russia, along with other imperialist powers, in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion (people's rebellion of the I-He-Chuan in 1900), is quoted to "bear out" the "unequalness" of the Aigun and Peking treaties concluded 40 years previously, and of which no mention at all is made in Lenin's article.

It is common knowledge that on accomplishing the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917, the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government not only ended the policy of oppression pursued by Russia's tsarist government against the Eastern peoples, but by their historic acts and practical deeds gave mankind the model of an entirely new class policy consistent with the interests of the working people in all countries.

None of the Soviet state documents and none of Lenin's statements refers to the border treaties with China as either unequal or subject to revision. At no time, anywhere, did Lenin cast doubt on the validity of the border between the USSR and China.

The fight under Lenin's leadership to liberate the Soviet Far East from Japanese and other foreign invaders is inscribed for all time in the heroic chronicle of our people. The Soviet Union cut short the sallies of the Chinese militarists in Manchuria, impinging on our frontiers, and those of the Japanese aggressors, testing our will and determination to defend the Soviet socialist homeland.

It was anything but accidental that the May 24 Statement of the CPR Government carefully avoided everything related to the expansionist anti-popular policy of the Chinese emperors. Scorning the class approach in appraising social phenomena, the CPR government endeavours to prove, in effect, that some feudal conquerors and oppressors of the peoples, those of China, were just, while all others were unjust, drawing the conclusion that the borders of the state of Russia should have collapsed with the collapse of the tsarist autocracy.

If the principle put forward in the CPR Government statement were accepted, namely, that the state identity of territories is determined not by the people inhabiting them, but by memories of past campaigns, then, evidently, Latin America should revert to the Spanish crown and the United States to the British fold, while Greece, heir to Alexander the Great, could probably lay claim to present-day Turkey, Syria, Iran, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, etc.

Until recently, the CPR Government was aware of what could happen to inter-state relations in the event of such an approach. In October 1960, Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, said, for example, that "if everybody were to begin settling scores dating to remote historical times, the world would be engulfed by chaos". Yet at present, seemingly, the opposite standpoint prevails in China on this score.

No territorial question really exists between the Soviet Union and China. There was, and can be, no question of any violation of the existing border situation by the Soviet side, no question of any "seizures of Chinese territory". For 50 years, the Soviet people and their armed forces have guarded the same frontiers of our country along the Amur and Ussuri rivers and in the Pamirs and Tien Shan. The border is just as unassailable today as it was yesterday. Any attempt at violating the Soviet frontier will meet with a crushing rebuff.

The Soviet Government cannot overlook the fact that like many other official CPR documents, the CPR Government statement of May 24, 1969, contains numerous slanderous fabrications and attacks insulting the Soviet state and the Soviet people. The Soviet Government considers it beneath its dignity to refute these fabrications. The insult and invective abounding in the CPR Government statement can hardly be viewed as evidence of any sincere desire by the Chinese side to search for a constructive solution of the issues in dispute.

In this connection, the Soviet Government cannot but draw attention to the fact that the provocations organised by the Chinese authorities on the Soviet border, are continuing. At the same time, official persons and organs of the CPR have mounted an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign that reaches out to all Chinese towns and villages. China's entire propaganda machine has been set in motion to fan anti-Soviet sentiment, in order to persuade the Chinese people that the Soviet Union is ostensibly planning to attack China. The absurdity of this is obvious. All reasonable men know that the Soviet people are preoccupied with peaceful creative labour, that they are building communism, that they have never attacked, nor intend to attack, anyone.

III.

The policy of the Soviet Union with regard to the Chinese people has been, and remains, the same; it is based on the long-term perspectives. We never forget that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide. The Soviet Union stands for good-neighbour relations and friendship with China, for eliminating all that may complicate the relations between our two countries. To those who sow strife between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the Soviet Government counterposes the Leninist internationalist policy of friendship, unity and co-

operation. The unity and cohesion of the peace-loving forces championing social and national emancipation are an earnest of victory against the threats and direct attacks of the imperialists.

Time and again, the Soviet Government approached the Government of the CPR with proposals to normalise relations between the two countries. The matter was put before the Chinese side more than once, and, in particular, in February 1965 and March 1966, when a high-level bilateral meeting was suggested to deal in detail with all controversial matters.

In its Statement of March 29, the Government of the USSR proposed renewing consultations between representatives of the Soviet Union and the CPR to discuss the question of specifying on the basis of operating border treaties the borderline at separate points. At present, it reiterates the consultations offer, naturally, with no advance conditions.

The Soviet side favours putting on record the joint opinion of both sides concerning those sections of the frontier over which no differences exist; coming to an understanding as regards the borderline concerning those separate sections over which differences exist by means of mutual consultations based on treaty documents; proceeding in the case of sections that underwent natural changes from operating treaties to define the borderline, while observing the principle of mutual concessions and the economic stake of the population of the localities concerned; and registering the agreement reached by signing an appropriate instrument.

The Soviet side is in accord with the standpoint of the CPR Government that "given the premise, that treaties on the present Soviet-Chinese border are taken as the basis, the necessary accommodation may be permitted at separate points of the border proceeding from the principles of consultations on a basis of equality, mutual understanding and mutual concessions."

The Soviet Government holds that to create forthwith an atmosphere of earnest and constructive discussion at the forthcoming consultations, it is necessary to exclude everything that stands in the way of this objective. For this reason it treats with understanding the reference in the CPR Government statement that the sides should avoid conflicts on the border, that their borderguards should not resort to arms in the performance of their duty, that they should not open fire on each other and resolve all questions arising while they guard the existing state borders by peaceful means only. It is equally necessary to rule out altogether cases where the border is violated by the sides on any pretext whatsoever. The Soviet borderguards and civilians are observing this principle stringently. The Government of the USSR hopes that Chinese borderguards and civilians, too, will be given the appropriate instructions.

The Soviet Government suggests that the consultations interrupted in 1964 should be resumed in Moscow within the next two or three months. The exact date could be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Soviet government appoints P. I. Zyryanov, fully authorised representative of the USSR in the rank of Deputy Minister, as head of the Soviet delegation at the consultations.

The Soviet Government expects the Government of the CPR to let it know in the early future whether it considers the above proposals concerning the date and venue for continuing the consultations, acceptable.

If the Government of the CPR is prepared to normalise the situation along the Soviet-Chinese border, the way to it is open.

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